Female Enfranchisement and the Conservative Voting Gap: Evidence from Gender-Separated Precinct Returns*

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Abstract

Do newly enfranchised groups vote according to their economic interests or their cultural identities? We study women's suffrage in Weimar Munich using a rare case where voting results were tabulated separately for men and women for each precinct in the 1924 election. Linking these returns to newly digitized pre-suffrage data on occupations, socioeconomic status, and religion, we estimate how gendered differences in local electorates shaped party support. On average, women voted 10 percentage points more for conservative-center parties than men, despite being poorer and enfranchised largely through the Social Democratic Party. While economic differences do not account for this gap, Catholic affiliation strongly predicts women's conservative voting; a result robust to instrumenting Catholic affiliation with proximity to Catholic churches. Our findings highlight the primacy of cultural identity over material self-interest in shaping political behavior.

Keywords: Female suffrage, Voting behavior, Religion, Cultural identity

JEL codes: D72, N42, J16

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1 Introduction

Do newly enfranchised groups vote according to their economic interests or cultural identities? Standard models of redistribution under universal suffrage predict that extending voting rights to poorer groups should increase support for left parties and redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Cascio and Shenhav, 2014; Fujiwara, 2015; Bhalotra et al., 2018). Yet systematic empirical evidence remains scarce because votes are secret and election returns rarely report ballots separately for newly enfranchised groups.

We exploit a rare case where such evidence exists: Five years after female suffrage, Munich's 1924 election uniquely recorded votes separately for men and women. Linking these results to detailed pre-suffrage data on socio-economic and religious composition, we estimate regressions of female–male differences in party support on female–male differences in the characteristics of the electorate. Our within-precinct design holds precinct characteristics constant, allowing us to relate gendered differences in the electorate to divergent voting.

Our empirical strategy builds on three newly digitized sources. First, gender-specific precinct returns from Munich's 1924 election allow us to compare male and female votes within voting precincts. Second, historical directories record occupation, socioeconomic status, and gender of all household heads, enabling us to construct pre-suffrage controls by gender of key economic characteristics. Third, address-level census data provide religious affiliation by gender. Linking these sources enables unusually precise tests of whether cultural or economic factors explain the observed gender gap.

The puzzle is stark. Female suffrage represented a major institutional change, expected to reshape political representation, public policy, and social inequalities (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). Standard accounts predict that extending the vote should shift governments leftward, increasing social spending and support for redistribution (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Miller, 2008). Yet historical evidence shows that newly enfranchised women often leaned more conservative than men (Ogburn and Goltra, 1919; Willey and Rice, 1924; Tingsten, 1937; Morgan-Collins, 2015). Our data confirm this paradox in Weimar Munich: women were about ten percentage points more likely than men to support conservative-center parties, despite being poorer and enfranchised largely through the Social Democratic Party, which had fought hardest for their voting rights.

Economic differences provide only limited explanation for the observed gender gap. Drawing on rich, individual data from historical city directories, we generate precinct-level measures of occupational income scores, the female population share, and the presence of elite women. Occupational scores and elite female presence are entirely insignificant, suggesting that income-related differences did not shape women's voting behavior. The share of women in a precinct does exhibit predictive power, indicating that demographics played some role. Yet its effect is modest—about half the size of the religious channel—underscoring that material self-interest, while not irrelevant, was secondary to other forces in shaping women's conservative alignment in Weimar Munich.

By contrast, religious identity emerges as the dominant factor. A large literature shows that

Catholicism strongly shaped political preferences in interwar Germany, with Catholic areas resisting nationalist appeals more effectively than Protestant ones (Falter, 1991; King et al., 2008; Spenkuch and Tillmann, 2018; Becker and Voth, 2023). Our detailed precinct-level data allow us to examine these dynamics within a single city. The results show that precincts with more Catholic women relative to men display markedly higher female support for the conservative center. This robust association is far stronger than any economic or demographic effect and indicates that cultural identity systematically shaped women's political behavior.

Other mechanisms frequently emphasized in the historical literature also fail to account for the gender gap. Using highly granular precinct-level data, we construct proxies for local social networks and local human capital. While these factors clearly mattered for political participation overall, they do not explain the systematic divergence between women's and men's votes.

Finally, we address concerns about sorting and omitted variables by exploiting spatial variation in proximity to Catholic churches before suffrage as an instrument for Catholic affiliation. The identifying assumption is that church distance affected political preferences only through Catholic affiliation, not through other socioeconomic channels. The strong first stage validates instrument relevance, and the IV estimates corroborate our baseline findings—if anything suggesting that the OLS correlations understate the true role of religion.

Our findings contribute to a longstanding debate in political economy over the political effects of franchise extensions. While models of redistribution predict leftward shifts, historical evidence from interwar Germany and the United States shows that newly enfranchised women often favored conservative parties that had opposed their enfranchisement, challenging the standard prediction. We extend this literature by demonstrating that in Weimar Munich, cultural identity — specifically religious affiliation — systematically outweighed economic self-interest in shaping women's votes.

More broadly, our results connect to work on identity economics (Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Bursztyn et al., 2017) and contemporary debates on franchise expansions. Recent extensions of voting rights—to immigrants, naturalized citizens, or younger cohorts—often assume that new voters will align with economic interests (Hainmueller et al., 2017; Verbeek, 2021). Our evidence cautions that such expectations may be misleading if entrenched cultural identities structure political preferences independently of material incentives (Alesina et al., 2021; Tabellini, 2020).

The paper proceeds in four steps. After describing the historical background, we begin our analysis by descriptively documenting gendered voting gaps using precinct-level returns. We then examine whether economic differences explain these patterns and show they do not. Next, we turn to religion, finding it to be the dominant predictor of women's conservative voting, a result that is robust to an IV strategy exploiting church proximity. Finally, we test alternative mechanisms highlighted in the historical literature, such as local networks and human capital, and show that they play little role.

2 Historical Background

At the onset of women's suffrage in 1918, German politics was commonly described as divided into three broad ideological blocs. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) supported suffrage and expected electoral returns for its redistributive platform. The Catholic Center, emphasized Christian social teaching. Parties on the nationalist right opposed suffrage and defended traditional male prerogatives (Bielefeld, 2023).

2.1 Elections during the Weimar Republic: 1919–1933

World War I ended on November 9, 1918 with the proclamation of the German Republic (*Deutsche Republik*), later known as the Weimar Republic. Seeking to overcome a structural disadvantage from the Imperial run-off system—in which it often led in the first round but lost to a unified conservative in the second—the SPD backed a new electoral law signed on November 30 that granted the vote to all men and women over twenty and replaced run-offs with proportional representation (Winkler, 1993, p. 65). Less than two months later, the first election of the Weimar Republic formed the National Constitutional Assembly on January 19, 1919. The Assembly signed the Treaty of Versailles and drafted the Weimar Constitution. It dissolved on May 21, 1920, with regular Reichstag elections held on June 6, 1920 (Winkler, 1993).

The Weimar Republic is famous for its fragmented multi-party system (Kronenberg, 2007). In part because proportional representation lacked an electoral threshold, the number of parties competing in Reichstag elections rose from seven in 1920 to nineteen in 1932 (Kronenberg, 2007). Broadly speaking, these parties fell into three ideological blocs (Falter et al., 1986):

The Conservative Center: The Catholic Zentrum party and its Bavarian counterpart, the Bavarian People's Party (BVP), represented religious conservatism. While Zentrum accepted female suffrage as part of the Weimar constitutional framework, it did not actively campaign for gender equality. Instead, it framed women's political engagement within the context of traditional family and religious values.

The Centre Left: The Social Democratic Party (SPD) was the dominant center-left force, focused on workers rights, social welfare and redistribution, with the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) and the Communist Party (KPD) positioned further to the left. Crucially, the SPD was the driving force behind female suffrage and campaigned on themes of gender equality and women's political participation.

The Nationalist Bloc: The German Democratic Party (DDP) and German People's Party (DVP) both opposed the Weimar Republic and the broader societal changes it introduced, including ex-

panded rights for women.[1] These parties instead advocated for nationalist values such as a return to the monarchy in addition to traditional gender roles.

2.2 Winning women's vote

Parties quickly targeted new female voters with distinct appeals. On the political left, the SPD campained on gender equality and female civic agency (Figure 1a), reflecting decades of activist organizing within the SPD (Sneeringer, 2002, p. 14). While both centrist and nationalist parties emphasized motherhood, social order, and traditional gender roles (Figures 1b–c), the values underpinning these appeals differed. For centrist parties, Christian faith provided the central frame — symbolized in Figure 1b by the cross around the woman's neck. For nationalist parties, by contrast, the nation-state was the primary reference point, conveyed in Figure 1c through the prominent flag and the absence of religious symbols. These campaign posters reflected the ideological visions on offer for the country: secular emancipation on the one hand or trandtional gender and family roles inspired by religion on the other (Sneeringer, 2002, p. 57).

Despite leading the fight for female suffrage, the SPD struggled to win women's votes. In a number of special election counts, women consistently supported parties other than the SPD, including in cities like Cologne, Munich, and other Bavarian towns (Sneeringer, 2002; Falter et al., 1986). Instead, female voters were more likely to support Zentrum or the BVP, reflecting the continued importance of religion and tradition in shaping women's political preferences.[2] Prominent suffrage activists—often independent, secular women—appear to have over-estimated the breadth of support for their agenda, under-weighting the pull of religion and family structures among the median female voter (Sandmann-Bremme, 1956; Sneeringer, 2002).

Taken together, the historical record points to a persistent pattern: women were less likely than men to support the party that secured their franchise. The irony of women's suffrage in the Weimar Republic is that socially conservative parties which had criticized the Social Democrats for for their advocacy of women's rights became the political home of large blocs of female voters.

3 Data

Our analysis is based on a newly digitized data from historical sources. The unit of observation is the electoral precinct for the in 1924 Munich elections, which are separated by gender. This yields a precinct-by-gender panel, enabling us to exploit within-precinct variation.

Gender-separated election results: Our analysis is based on precinct-level election results for Munich in 1924, which were tabulated separately for women and men. A precinct is the smallest

[1] The nationalist bloc also includes extreme far-right parties such as the German National People's Party (DNVP) as well as Hitler's National Socialist Freedom Movement (NSDAP).

[2] We confirm these accounts collecting extensive data on election counts by gender. Appendix Figure B.1 reports average vote shares for center-left parties (a) center (b) for 34 large cities separately by gender. In every city, center-left parties gained fewer votes from women, while center parties gained more.

level of aggregation and on average aggregates the vote of 1106 men and 1325 women in 1924.

Two sets of documents survived in the archives: (1) the election results by precinct number and (2) a list of each address and the precinct to which it belongs. We use this mapping between addresses and election results to identify the exact households per voting district per election. We merge these election results to our directory data in 1924, effectively linking 219,087 households to one of the 175 voting precincts in which they were located.

City Directories (Address Bücher): We obtain pre-franchise covariates from the city directory in 1910. As noted in Bühler et al. (2024), city directories were the primary source to locate and contact people in a city. They contained the names of the heads of each household in the city, the exact address, occupation of the household head as well as an indicator for whether a woman leading a household was a widow. We obtain scanned copies of the 1910 directory from the Bavarian State Library and transcribe the entries with the help of a data entry company. Bühler et al. (2024) note that the transcription error is less than 0.1%. We use this data in order to generate precinct-level aggregates of occupational income scores by gender as well as the share of elite women in a precinct.

There are two primary reasons why information from the Munich city directories is especially suitable for quantitative analysis. First, during the late 19^{th} and early 20^{th} century, Munich was a large, industrial and rapidly growing urban center in the country with active political participation across the spectrum. Second, the records are published by the police administration of the state of Bavaria and by the city of Munich and rely on resident registration records, making the data accurate and complete.

City Census: We collect data from the last pre-franchise census in 1910 to construct the 1912 voting precincts. These data come from the city archives and contain information at the address level (i.e., an apartment building, but not the specific unit within the building). In this census, enumerators recorded the exact number of men and women at every address. We thus use this data to calculate precinct level measures of the share of population that is male or female. This census also contains data at the level of *Stadtbezirk* (city district), which details the share of catholic inhabitants by gender.[3]

Linking procedure Starting from the city census in 1910, we start from a basis of 16,351 addresses in 961 streets in which on average 17 men and 19 women lived. We link 99.4% of these addresses to the 1910 directory and obtain pre-franchise covariates from more than 170,000 households. We then use the respective directory of 1910 and 1924 to identify the exact precinct of each

[3]There are 26 city districts in Munich. Data available in 'Statistisches Amt der Stadt München (1912), Mitteilungen des Statistischen Amtes XXIV, Heft 1, 1. Teil, Page 25. This implies precincts lie within a city district. Aggregating to or clustering at the city district level does not quantitatively affect our results.

address. In total 14,145 addresses in 906 streets can be linked to a precinct in 1924 and 1912. Relating the number of households per address to the number of households per precinct in 1924, we calculate the expected votes from each address for each party.[4] Finally, we aggregate these expected vote results for men and women to the precinct boundaries of 1912, and link the resulting precinct-by-gender results to the covariates established from the census and directory of 1910. While the analysis could be done using 1924 data alone, the inclusion of pre-franchise data alleviates concerns about endogenous covariates.

We summarize our data in Table A.1, highlighting differences between women and men per precinct in 1910. While women appeared much less frequently in the directories and are poorer than men on average — an underestimate originating from the construction of directories that focused on household heads. Yet, the census shows precincts did contain on average more 196 more women than man. Women are also 4.6% more likely to be catholic, and poorer on average.

4 Female Voting Gap

We begin by establishing our first contribution: documenting the gender gap in voting in the 1924 election. Exploiting the highly granular nature of our data, we investigate this descriptively in two ways.

First, Figure 2 provides a geographical visualization of both our data and spatial voting patterns in Munich during the May 1924 election. The maps show precinct-level vote shares for conservative-center parties, separately for men (Panel a) and women (Panel b), using address-level mappings to assign each household to its correct voting precinct. Several patterns emerge. While male support for conservative parties appears somewhat dispersed and weaker across the city, female support is notably more concentrated and intense, especially in the central and eastern districts. These darker areas on the right-hand map indicate precincts where over 35 percent of women voted for conservative-center parties—substantially higher than the corresponding male support in the same locations. This spatial divergence provides early visual evidence of gendered voting behavior and highlights the granularity of our precinct-level dataset.

Second, in Figure 3 we plot the vote share for conservative-center parties by gender across all 175 precincts in Munich. Each vertical line connects the male (black square) and female (white square) vote shares within the same precinct, sorted in increasing order of the conservative gender gap. The figure reveals a striking and consistent pattern: in every precinct, women voted more for conservative-center parties than men. The gender gap is substantial, with virtually no overlap in the distributions. This pattern aligns with historical accounts emphasizing the role of religion and traditional values in shaping women's political preferences. Greater female support for conservative-center parties also implies lower support for center-left parties, such as the SPD, which had championed female suffrage.

[4] In precinct 151, with 1,363 households in 135 addresses, the center party gained 138 votes from men and 324 from women. Thus, each household is expected to contribute 0.339 votes to the center party's total tally. That is, at the average address precinct 151, the center party gains 1 vote from men and 2.4 votes from women.

5 Drivers of the Female Voting Gap

Next, we quantify the female voting gap and examine what drives it. Drawing on prior literature, we test two main explanations for the gender voting gap. A large body of work highlights the persistent role of religion and culture, particularly Catholic affiliation, in shaping political preferences (Falter, 1991; King et al., 2008; Spenkuch and Tillmann, 2018; Becker and Voth, 2023). By contrast, theories of enfranchisement in political economy emphasize that voting behavior, especially in cases of female suffrage, should primarily reflect underlying economic interests (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Miller, 2008; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Our analysis therefore evaluates the relative importance of these two forces in explaining women's conservative alignment. To do so, we leverage a newly digitized dataset linking over 200,000 individuals to precinct-level voting outcomes in post-suffrage Munich. While we do not observe individual voting behavior, the fine-grained nature of our data allows us to identify systematic gender differences with unusual precision.

5.1 Empirical Design

Our starting point is a unique precinct-by-gender panel from the 1924 election that records male and female votes separately. What makes our setting distinctive is that we are able able to construct gender-specific measures of economic activity and religious affiliation, drawing on highly granular data from the 1910 city census and city directory. This combination allows us to examine, for the first time, how observable characteristics of individuals and neighborhoods shaped men's and women's voting behavior differently in the early years of universal suffrage. To this end, we estimate the parameters of the following empirical specification:

$$\begin{aligned} Center_{1924,p,g} = \beta_0 Female\ Vote_g + \Gamma_p \\ + \beta Share\ Catholic_{1910,p,g} \times Female\ Vote_g \\ + Econ_{1910,p,g} \times Female\ Vote_g \\ + \Theta_p \times Female\ Vote_g + \epsilon_{p,g} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Where $\text{Center}_{p,g}$ is the vote share for conservative-center parties in precinct p for gender g. Female Vote_g is a binary variable is set to 1 for female votes and 0 for male votes.

The constant β_0 captures the raw gender gap in support for conservative-center parties. In other words, it measures the average difference in voting between women and men across all 175 precincts. Precinct fixed effects, denoted by Γ_p, absorb all characteristics common to both genders within a precinct, allowing us to interpret coefficients on interactions with the female indicator as differential effects on women, relative to men in the same precinct.

To explore cultural drivers of the voting gap, we include the share of Catholics (measured separately for men and women) in the precinct, $\text{Share Catholic}_{1910,p,g}$, and interact it with the female vote indicator. Since these measures are constant within a precinct, the interaction isolates the ex-

tent to which the presence of Catholic women (and men) explains why women in some precincts vote more conservatively than their male counterparts.

To test the economic channel, we include gender-specific economic characteristics in our estimation. These include (i.) occupational scores (as proxies for income); (ii.) the relative size of the female/male population in the precinct; and (iii.) the share of *independent* women, all measured prior to female suffrage and collected from historical directories and census sources. We define independent women as non-widowed women who appear in the city directory as household heads (i.e., living without a husband).[5] Our data indicate that these women disproportionately belonged to the economic elite, with high representation among rentiers and business owners. These measures form the vector $Econ_{1910,p}$, which we interact with the female vote indicator to estimate how economic characteristics shaped women's voting behavior differently from men's.

Finally, we include a set of precinct-level controls, denoted by Θ_p, which capture additional dimensions of local economic and social activity that may affect male and female voters differently. Specifically, we measure the distance to the nearest school, as a proxy for access to human capital, and the distance to the nearest inn, as a proxy for information dissemination and social networks which have been shown to shape political participation (Satyanath et al., 2017). As with the cultural and economic measures, these controls are interacted with the female vote indicator to capture gender-specific effects.

While our baseline specifications document robust gender-based differences in voting patterns after enfranchisement, the coefficient on the gender dummy (and its interactions) should be interpreted as descriptive rather than causal. It captures systematic differences in outcomes between women and men, net of precinct-level characteristics, but does not by itself establish a causal mechanism. To address concerns about sorting and omitted variables, we complement these descriptive results with an instrumental variables approach that leverages historical church locations. This strategy allows us to move beyond descriptive patterns and provide some evidence that support a more a causal interpretation between female Catholicism and conservative voting.

5.2 Baseline Results

Table 1 reports the results from estimating equation 1. We focus on the coefficients for the female-specific measures of our economic and religious variables; the corresponding male measures are included in all specifications but omitted from the table for brevity.[6] A central puzzle motivates this analysis: despite the SPD's role in securing women's suffrage, women did not reward the party at the ballot box. Instead, they disproportionately supported the conservative-center parties (Zentrum and BVP). Our baseline results therefore ask whether economic or cultural factors account for this gendered shift toward the conservative center.

[5]The share of independent women does not have a male counterpart because we cannot observe which male household heads are married, widowed or unmarried. Thus, the male residential density is a share of households headed by men, whereas the share of independent women is the share of unmarried and un-widowed women leading a household.

[6]Full results for male coefficients can be found in Appendix Table A.2.

Female Voting Gap: In column 1 we estimate the coefficient on the gender dummy, providing a benchmark for the magnitude of the gender gap documented in Figures 2 and 3. Pooling across all 175 precincts, women vote 10 percentage points more for the conservative center than men. This difference is substantial, amounting to nearly a 63 percent increase relative to the mean dependent variable for men (i.e., the conservative center in 1924 won 16.4 percent of the male vote).

Religious Affiliation: A substantial literature has explored factors shaping voting behavior and political preferences in interwar Germany, ranging from economic hardship and social networks to wartime experiences and cultural attitudes. Following Becker and Voth (2023), religious affiliation consistently emerges as a crucial determinant of voters' susceptibility to conservative or nationalist political appeals. Catholic areas tended to resist extremist and nationalist messages more effectively than Protestant regions, reflecting deep-rooted differences in religiously shaped political culture (Falter, 1991; King et al., 2008; Spenkuch and Tillmann, 2018). While previous evidence primarily relies on comparisons across cities or regions, our detailed precinct-level data uniquely allows us to test whether religious affiliation shaped voting patterns within a single urban context.

In column 2 of Table 1, we investigate the influence of female Catholic affiliation on female voting behavior. The coefficient of interest suggests that a one percentage point increase in the share of catholic women in a precinct increases female voting for the conservative center by nearly 0.8 percentage points. The overall female voting gap now switches sign and is estimated with less precision, suggesting that religious affiliation is a significant driver of the overall voting gap.

Economic Drivers: The 1924 elections were the third held after female enfranchisement in 1918, an institutional change that reshaped political representation in Germany. More broadly, a large literature shows that extending the franchise can shift political outcomes, reshape public policy, and alter social inequalities (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). Many studies find that enfranchisement pushed governments leftward, increasing social spending and liberal representation (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Miller, 2008; Teele, 2018). At the same time, historical evidence shows that women often voted more conservatively than men (Ogburn and Goltra, 1919; Willey and Rice, 1924; Tingsten, 1937; Morgan-Collins, 2015). To disentangle these competing forces, column 3 introduces gender-specific measures of economic activity and explicitly contrasts economic explanations of voting behavior with religious and cultural ones. We use three indicators: occupational scores (as proxies for income), the share of the precinct population that is female, and the share of elite women (i.e., independent women).

Our results show little evidence that income-related measures such as occupational scores or the share of elite women significantly shaped women's voting behavior. By contrast, the share of Catholic women remains a large and precisely estimated predictor, reinforcing the hypothesis that religion and culture outweighed economic incentives in terms of voting behavior. While the size of the female population, does exhibit some predictive power, its coefficient is only about

half the magnitude of the Catholic coefficient, and $t-$tests confirm that the two differ significantly. The inclusion of economic variables nearly triples the overall gender gap coefficient, which, as in column 2, remains negative marginally significant. Taken together, these findings suggest that the raw gender voting gap was primarily driven by religious affiliation and, to a lesser extent, demographic composition rather than economic characteristics.

Social Networks and Human Capital: Column 4 adds our interacted precinct-level controls: distance to the nearest school (as a proxy for human capital) and distance to the nearest inn (as a proxy for social networks and information exchange). Including these measures does not alter the overall patterns in the data. The share of Catholic women continues to be the dominant and most precisely estimated predictor of female conservative voting.

Overall, the inclusion of additional economic, demographic, and contextual controls does little to alter the core finding: female Catholic affiliation remains by far the strongest predictor of women's conservative voting. What is more, the estimated coefficient on female Catholic affiliation is remarkably stable across specifications, further highlighting religion, rather than economic or demographic factors, as the key driver of the observed gender gap. This stability reduces, but does not eliminate, the threat from unobserved variables.

5.3 IV Estimates

We address remaining concerns that the observed link between female Catholic affiliation and conservative voting may reflect sorting or omitted variables by employing an instrumental-variables strategy. Sorting would require Catholics to relocate before suffrage in anticipation of influencing later election outcomes. This seems implausible: precinct-level results were aggregated to a single electoral district in Munich, meaning the distribution of votes across precincts did not affect representation in 1924. Moreover, women in 1910 could not have anticipated voting in 1924, given that suffrage was only introduced after World War I and the fall of the Empire.

Omitted variables pose another potential challenge, though they would need to differentially affect women relative to men. One possibility is that Catholic families encouraged more male enlistment in World War I, raising male mortality and leaving a surplus of Catholic women. Yet universal conscription in Germany rules out systematic denominational differences in service. Another possibility is that Catholic women were less likely to work outside the home than Protestant women, reinforcing stronger ties to family and parish life. If so, both higher female Catholic shares and stronger conservative voting might emerge from underlying labor market differences. While plausible, this channel would bias estimates only if female employment opportunities varied systematically by denomination while male opportunities did not.

To address these concerns, we construct an instrument based on proximity to Catholic churches, following Becker and Voth (2023). Specifically, we calculate the average distance to the nearest catholic church for all inhabitants in each precinct of Munich. These churches were built decades

earlier and are distributed densely across Munich, making it unlikely that families sorted strategically within a few hundred meters to influence election outcomes.[7] Proximity might in principle affect women's labor market roles, for example through parish charity or domestic service, but such effects are likely second-order. Catholic churches were nearly ubiquitous in Munich, with locations established decades earlier, and proximity is not systematically correlated with female occupational scores.

Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 report the IV results using distance to the nearest Catholic church as an instrument for the female Catholic share. The first stage is strong, with an F-statistic of 25.[8] The IV estimates reinforce our baseline findings: precincts with more Catholic women display significantly higher support for the conservative center. To the extent that church proximity influences female voting behavior only through Catholic affiliation, these results provide strong evidence for a causal link between female Catholicism and conservative voting, underscoring the primacy of religious over economic explanations.

5.4 Religion or Economics

Table 2 reports the specifications from Table 1, columns (4) and (6), augmented with the relative impact of a one-standard deviation change in female Catholic share and female population (reported in italics). This extension allows a direct comparison of the relative importance of religion and economic composition.

A one-standard deviation increase in female Catholic share (5.3%) raises conservative vote shares by 4.4 percentage points in OLS and 8.1 percentage points in 2SLS. By contrast, a one-standard deviation increase in female population (3.7%) raises conservative support by only 1.2-1.9 percentage points. Since the point estimates are also significantly different, this comparison highlights the outsized impact of religious factors over economic factors.

In columns 3 and 4, we repeat this for center-left parties. As shown, there is no gender voting gap for these parties, and female religious affiliation displays no predictive power on these vote shares. In columns 5 and 6, we examine nationalist parties on the far right. These parties combined traditional appeals to women's roles as mothers and caretakers with more extreme nationalist demands, including a return to the monarchy. In contrast to the conservative-center, female Catholic affiliation predicts lower relative support for these parties. At the median level of female Catholicism in a precinct, the marginal effect of the female vote gap is significantly negative, suggesting that Catholic women, while more conservative than men in general, resisted the more extreme nationalist platform.

[7] The average distance to the nearest Catholic church is 385 meters, compared to more than one kilometer for Protestant churches.

[8] Clustering at the Stadtbezirks level also yields a strong instrument with an F-statistic over 10; results at this level with 26 clusters are similar.

6 Conclusion

Our analysis of Munich's 1924 election provides rare, precinct-level evidence on the political preferences of newly enfranchised women. Despite being poorer and enfranchised largely through the efforts of the Social Democratic Party, women gave on average ten percentage points more of their vote share to conservative-center parties than men. Socio-economic indicators such as occupational scores and elite female presence fail to explain this gap, while demographic measures like the female population share account for only a small fraction of it. By contrast, Catholic affiliation is a strong and consistent predictor: precincts with more Catholic women relative to men display markedly higher female support for the conservative center. This result holds across specifications and remains robust when instrumenting Catholic affiliation with proximity to Catholic churches.

These findings shed light on a central assumption of standard models of redistribution: that voters primarily act on their economic self-interest. Such models predict that extending voting rights to poorer groups should increase support for redistribution, and this logic has been borne out in many contexts. Yet our evidence shows that, at least in the case of newly enfranchised women in Weimar Munich, cultural and religious values could weigh more heavily than economic position. Women's first electoral choices reflected religious alignment rather than material incentives, illustrating how identity can mediate the political consequences of franchise extensions. More broadly, this suggests that the effects of enfranchisement depend on the balance between identity and class, cautioning against simple expectations that expanding the vote will uniformly generate leftward shifts.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Selected election posters (1920)

(a) SPD **(b)** Zentrum **(c)** DVP

These election posters are from the 1920 election of the Weimar Republic. The left shows the poster of the SPD (social democratic party) promoting equality between men and women (*Same Rights=Same Duty*). The center poster shows the Zentrum (christian-conservative party) asking *"Who saves the Christian mothers children?*" The right shows a poster of the German People's Party (DVP) promoting women as mothers, saving the future of their children.

Figure 2: Spatial voting patterns in Munich



(a) Male Votes **(b)** Female Votes

This map assigns each address its exact precinct. Shades denote the vote share for conservative-center parties in 1924 for men (a) and women (b).

Figure 3: Voting patterns in Munich



This figure plots the votes of women and men in every precinct of Munich. No single precinct records more center votes from men than from women. Precincts sorted by the size of the conservative voting gap.

Table 1: The Female Voting Gap
Conservative Center Parties

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Female Vote	0.101***	-0.100*	-0.273*	-0.254	-0.305**	-0.399*
	(0.003)	(0.054)	(0.159)	(0.163)	(0.153)	(0.210)
Share Female Catholic × Female Vote		0.763***	0.834***	0.823***	1.431***	1.517***
		(0.184)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.485)	(0.523)
Average Income of Women × Female Vote			-0.016	-0.016		-0.015
			(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.016)
Share Female Population × Female Vote			0.355**	0.330*		0.508**
			(0.176)	(0.181)		(0.218)
Share Independent Women × Female Vote			0.015	0.018		-0.162
			(0.181)	(0.183)		(0.230)
Distance to closest Pub × Female Vote				0.000		0.000
				(0.000)		(0.000)
Distance to closest School × Female Vote				-0.006		-0.003
				(0.024)		(0.025)
Observations	350	350	350	350	350	350
Precincts	175	175	175	175	175	175
First Stage F-Statistic					25.05	26.66
Male controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

This table establishes the female voting gap for conservative center parties. The unit of observation is a precinct by gender. Precincts are normalized to the 175 precincts of 1912. Precinct fixed effects included in all columns. *Female Vote* is a binary variable indicating the vote share of women voting for center parties. The coefficient in column (1) thus denotes the average voting gap between women and men for conservative parties. *Share Female Catholic* gives the average share of women reporting catholic as their religious affiliation (84.3%). We control for the male share of individuals reporting catholic as their religious affiliation in Male controls (79.6%). Variables constructed from the city-district census in 1910. *Average Income* denotes the average occupational score of women in a precinct (4.575, men: 4.618). Variable constructed from the directory in 1910. *Share Female Population* denotes the share women living in a district (53.3% or 1,595 women). Variable constructed from the address-level census in 1910. *Share Independent Women* denotes the share of women that are recorded as household heads in the directory of 1910, but are non-widowed (8.0%). *Distance to closest Pub* and *Distance to closest School* is the average distance to the closest pub (82m) or school (311m) in each precinct. Variables constructed from the directory in 1910. Full results, including the male variables reported in Table A.2. Standard errors clustered by precinct shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: The Female Voting Gap
Center-left and center-right parties

	Center		Center Left		Nationalist Bloc	
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) OLS	(6) 2SLS
Female Vote	-0.254	-0.399*	-0.174	-0.150	0.431***	0.549***
	(0.163)	(0.210)	(0.109)	(0.127)	(0.100)	(0.134)
Share Female Catholic × Female Vote	0.823***	1.517***	0.098	-0.014	-0.986***	-1.552***
	(0.228)	(0.523)	(0.127)	(0.303)	(0.155)	(0.395)
One SD change in Female Catholic:	*[0.044]*	*[0.081]*	*[0.005]*	*[-0.001]*	*[-0.052]*	*[-0.082]*
Share Female Population × Female Vote	0.330*	0.508**	0.170**	0.141	-0.396***	-0.541***
	(0.181)	(0.218)	(0.085)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.138)
One SD change in Female Population:	*[0.012]*	*[0.019]*	*[0.006]*	*[0.005]*	*[-0.015]*	*[-0.020]*
Observations	350	350	350	350	350	350
P-value: economic = religion	0.002	0.007	0.499	0.488	0.000	0.001
First Stage F-Statistic		26.66		26.66		26.66
Male controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Economic controls × Female Vote	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Precinct characteristics × Female Vote	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

This table establishes the female voting gap for all parties and contrasts the impact of religion to the impact of economic variables. The unit of observation is a precinct by gender. Precincts are normalized to the 175 precincts of 1912. Precinct fixed effects included in all columns. *Female Vote* is a binary variable indicating the vote share of women voting for either party. The coefficient in column (1) thus denotes the average voting gap between women and men for the respective party. *Share Female Catholic* gives the average share of women reporting catholic as their religious affiliation (84.3%). We control for the male share of individuals reporting catholic as their religious affiliation in Male controls (79.6%). Variables constructed from the city-district census in 1910. *Share Female Population* denotes the share women living in a district (53.3% or 1,595 women). Variable constructed from the address-level census in 1910. Below each variable, we report the estimated percentage point change in voting outcomes, if the dependent variable changes by one standard deviation. *P-value: economic = religion* reports the p-value from a test on whether the coefficients *Share Female Catholic* × *Female Vote* and *Share Female Population* × *Female Vote* are the same. Additional controls are reported in Table 1, columns (4) and (6). Standard errors clustered by precinct shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

For Online Publication: Appendix

12th September 2025

A Summary Statistics

Table A.1: Summary Statistics
By source and gender

	Men		Women		Difference		Source
Variable	Obs.	Average	Obs.	Average	Obs.	Average	
Voting outcomes:							
Center Left	175	0.369	175	0.283	175	-0.086	Election Archives
Center	175	0.164	175	0.265	175	0.101	Election Archives
Center Right	175	0.420	175	0.410	175	-0.010	Election Archives
Religion:							
Share Catholics	175	0.796	175	0.843	175	0.046	Census 1910, city district
Distance to closest Church					175	385m	Directory 1910
Economic:							
Share Population	175	0.533	175	0.467	175	0.066	Census 1910, address
Average Occupation Score	175	4.618	175	4.575	175	-0.044	Directory 1910
Share Independent Women					175	0.080	Directory 1910
Precinct characteristic:							
Distance to closest Pub					175	82m	Directory 1910
Distance to closest School					175	311m	Directory 1910

The variables are constructed as follows from the indicated sources and averaged within the precinct. *Share Catholic*: The Stadtbezirks representation of the 1910 census details the share catholic for each gender. *Share Population*: Using the address-level census in 1910 detailing the number of men and women per address. *Average Occupation Score*: following Bühler et al. (2024) and using the stated occupation in the directory to categorize occupational income score for each individual. *Share Independent Women*: Using the directory we relate the number of households headed by non-widowed women to the number of households in that precinct. *Share Household heads*: counting the number of female and male first names per address in the directory. *Distance to closest Church*: Using the directory we locate the exact geo coordinates of the closest church and calculate the distance to every address. *Distrance to closest School*: Using the directory we locate the exact geo coordinates of the closest school and calculate the distance to every address. *Distrance to closest Pub*: Using the directory we locate the exact geo coordinates of the closest Pub and calculate the distance to every address.

Table A.2: The Female Voting Gap
Full Results

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) OLS	(6) 2SLS
Female Vote	0.101***	-0.100*	-0.273*	-0.254	-0.305**	-0.399*
	(0.003)	(0.054)	(0.159)	(0.163)	(0.153)	(0.210)
Share Female Catholic × Female Vote		0.763***	0.834***	0.823***	1.431***	1.517***
		(0.184)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.485)	(0.523)
Share Male Catholic × Female Vote		-0.555***	-0.544***	-0.539***	-1.005***	-1.069***
		(0.142)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.329)	(0.406)
Average Income of Women × Female Vote			-0.016	-0.016		-0.015
			(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.016)
Average Income of Male × Female Vote			-0.003	-0.003		-0.025
			(0.021)	(0.021)		(0.023)
Share Female Population × Female Vote			0.355**	0.330*		0.508**
			(0.176)	(0.181)		(0.218)
Share Independent Women × Female Vote			0.015	0.018		-0.162
			(0.181)	(0.183)		(0.230)
Distance to closest Pub × Female Vote				0.000		0.000
				(0.000)		(0.000)
Distance to closest School × Female Vote				-0.006		-0.003
				(0.024)		(0.025)
Observations	350	350	350	350	350	350
Precincts	175	175	175	175	175	175
Adjusted R2	0.807	0.829	0.839	0.838	0.854	0.865
First Stage F-Statistic					25.05	26.66
Male controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

This table establishes the female voting gap for conservative center parties. The unit of observation is a precinct by gender. Precincts are normalized to the 175 precincts of 1912. Precinct fixed effects included in all columns. *Female Vote* is a binary variable indicating the vote share of women voting for center parties. The coefficient in column (1) thus denotes the average voting gap between women and men for conservative parties. *Share Female Catholic* gives the average share of women reporting catholic as their religious affiliation (84.3%). We control for the male share of individuals reporting catholic as their religious affiliation in Male controls (79.6%). Variables constructed from the city-district census in 1910. *Average Income* denotes the average occupational score of women in a precinct (4.575, men: 4.618). Variable constructed from the directory in 1910. *Share Female Population* denotes the share women living in a district (53.3% or 1,595 women). Variable constructed from the address-level census in 1910. *Share Independent Women* denotes the share of women that are recorded as household heads in the directory of 1910, but are non-widowed (8.0%). *Distance to closest Pub* and *Distance to closest School* is the average distance to the closest pub (82m) or school (311m) in each precinct. Variables constructed from the directory in 1910. Standard errors clustered by precinct shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1 Within-precinct, differenced specification

Another way to assess the importance of religion in the voting gap is to regress the differences in voting preferences on the differences in religious affiliation. Our starting point is a conceptual decomposition, representing precinct-level vote shares as the sum of gender-specific factors, precinct-level influences, and observable characteristics:

$$Center_p^g = \beta_g + \delta \mathcal{X}_{p,g} + \Gamma_p + \epsilon_{p,g} \quad \forall g \in \{Women, Men\}. \tag{2}$$

Here, $Center_p^g$ denotes average precinct-level support for center parties from gender group g. Subtracting male from female vote shares within the same precinct yields:

$$\Delta Center_{j,p} = \beta_{Female\ Voting\ Gap,j} + \Delta \mathcal{X}_{p,g} + \varepsilon_{j,p}. \tag{A.1}$$

Equation (A.1) thus captures the precinct-level gender difference in vote shares, with male vote shares serving as the baseline.

Empirically, this design amounts to regressing precinct-level female–male differences in party support on differences in covariates, including measures of religious affiliation such as proximity to Catholic churches. Because both male and female outcomes are observed within the same precinct and election, the differenced formulation absorbs all common precinct-level characteristics. To ensure that covariates are unaffected by enfranchisement, we rely on pre-suffrage measures from the 1910 city directory.

While conceptually equivalent to the panel formulation used in the main text, this differenced regression offers a simpler way to quantify descriptive gender gaps net of observable characteristics. Table A.3 suggests that if women are as Catholic affiliated as men, the voting gap is 10.6% (or 6.1% in the IV). If, however, women are 5 percentage points more religious than men, the voting gap *increases* to 12.2% (or 14.3% in the IV). The relative magnitudes are large with 15% in the OLS and a doubling in the IV, underscoring the importance of Catholic affiliation for the voting decision of women.

Table A.3: The Female Voting Gap
Differenced Specification

	Center		Center Left		Center Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Average Vote Gap	0.106***	0.061**	-0.123***	-0.114***	0.026**	0.065***
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.019)
Share Catholic (1910)	0.312**	1.644***	0.137**	-0.136	-0.464***	-1.621***
	(0.149)	(0.541)	(0.068)	(0.283)	(0.110)	(0.440)
Economic Covariates (1910)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Precinct Covariates (1910)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Male Vote	0.164	0.164	0.369	0.369	0.420	0.420
Observations	175	175	175	175	175	175
Adjusted R2	0.863	0.766	0.929	0.922	0.354	-0.321
First Stage F-Stat		14.859		14.859		14.859

This table establishes the female voting gap for conservative center parties. The unit of observation is a precinct by gender. Precincts are normalized to the 175 precincts of 1912. Precinct fixed effects included in all columns. *Female Vote* is a binary variable indicating the vote share of women voting for center parties. The coefficient in column (1) thus denotes the average voting gap between women and men for conservative parties. *Share Female Catholic* gives the average share of women reporting catholic as their religious affiliation (84.3%). We control for the male share of individuals reporting catholic as their religious affiliation in Male controls (79.6%). Variables constructed from the city-district census in 1910. *Share Female Population* denotes the share women living in a district (53.3% or 1,595 women). Variable constructed from the address-level census in 1910. *Average Income* denotes the average occupational score of women in a precinct (4.575, men: 4.618). Variable constructed from the directory in 1910. *Share Independent Women* denotes the share of women, relative to the total female population, that are recorded as household heads in the directory of 1910, but are non-widowed (4.4%). Standard errors clustered by precinct shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B Historical Background and Data

Figure B.1: The Conservative Voting Gap across German Cities

This figure plots average vote shares for the conservative center and the center-left, defined as SPD and KPD separately for women and men across 33 German cities between 1920 and 1930.

Figure B.2: Precinct division 1924



Stellvertreter:
Strobel Mathilde, Augustenstr. 73.

38. Stimmbezirk. (III)

Augustenstraße 25 mit 51 unger. und 34 mit 60 ger.,
Gabelsbergerstraße 65 mit 105 unger. und 40 mit 78 ger.,
Rottmannstraße.

Wahlraum für Männer:
Gasthaus zur Gabelsbergerbrauerei, Gabelsbergerstraße 50.

Wahlvorsteher:
Müller August, Bäckermeister, Gabelsbergerstraße 83.

Stellvertreter:
Korn Berthold, Kaufmann, Gabelsbergerstraße 71.

Wahlraum für Frauen:
Gasthaus zur Gabelsbergerbrauerei, Gabelsbergerstraße 50.

Wahlvorsteher:
Müller Anna, Kaufmanns-Gattin, Rottmannstraße 16.

40. Stimmbezirk. (III)

Enhuberstraße,
Theresienstraße 37 mit 93 unger. und 74 mit 160 ger.

Wahlraum für Männer:
Restaurant Modern, Theresienstr. 80.

Wahlvorsteher:
Rast August, Eisenbahn-Inspektor, Theresienstraße 83.

Stellvertreter:
Müller Johann, Bäckermeister, Theresienstraße 71.

Wahlraum für Frauen:
Gasthaus zum schwarzen Rössel, Enhuberstraße 1.

Wahlvorsteher:
Carl Marianne, Zigarrengeschäfts-Inhaberin, Theresienstraße 51.

Stellvertreter:
Schwartling Regina, Sekretärin, Enhuberstraße 7 Rg.

41. Stimmbezirk. (III)

42. Stimmbezirk. (III)

Arnulfstraße 76, 90, 92, 94,
Blutenburgstraße 2 mit 46 ger. und 3, 5,
Denisstraße,
Deroystraße,
Haslangstraße,
Herbststraße,
Maillingerstraße mit Ausn. v. 34, 34a, b, c, d, 35,
Marsplatz,
Marsstraße 14 mit 27 fortl.,
Mercystraße,
Pranckhstraße.
Weinbierlhof.

Wahlraum für Männer:
Schule am Marsplatz 10 (Turnhalle an der Pranckhstraße).

Wahlvorsteher:
Albrecht Franz, Verwaltungssekretär, Blutenburgstraße 30 (Eingang Adamstraße).

Stellvertreter:
Günther Johann, Hilfsarbeiter, Maillingerstraße 3 Rg.

Wahlraum für Frauen:
Städt. Gewerbeschule, Deroystraße 1.

This figure illustrates the assignment of streets and individual addresses (e.g. Arnulfstraße 76, 90, 92, 94 in precinct 42) to precincts in the May 1924 Munich election. The three voting precincts highlight the detail of our data: In precinct 38, men and women cast their votes at the same polling station, while in precinct 40, polling was gender-segregated, and the election officers were exclusively female.

To illustrate the precision of our spatial linking procedure and the heterogeneity in electoral arrangements, Figure B.2 maps address-to-precinct assignments for the May 1924 election. Each address in the city directories is matched to its corresponding precinct using administrative records listing which streets belonged to which precinct. Figure B.2 highlights two precincts to demonstrate variation in gendered polling practices: Precinct 38, where men and women voted at the same location, and Precinct 40, where polling was segregated by gender and female election officers administered the women's station. [9]

Figure B.3 uses the 1924 directory to find the poll station for precinct 40 (a), the election officer (b) and its substitute (c), from Figure B.2. While we can identify these individuals, there exist no individual-level census data for the period of interest that allow to geolocate individuals with their exact address, their full name, and occupation; especially not of women.

[9] This variation—visible in administrative forms and confirmed in archival notes—shows that precinct-level election records not only capture vote shares by gender but also reflect institutional variation in how newly enfranchised women were incorporated into the democratic process.

Figure B.3: Directory (Adressbuch) 1924

Hinterseher Gg. Wirtschaftspächt. 0
Pex Martin Reisender 0
Ederer Joseph Werkmstr. i. Baug. 1
Grabs Hugo Maschinenmeister 1
Schäffler Adolf Kupferschmied 2
Lang Julius Tapezierer 2
Lueger Maria Metzgerswe. 2
Rieger Aloisia Straßenb.-Wagenf.-Witwe 3
Ebnet Johann Hafner 3
Gärtner Joseph Schreiner 4
Carsten Karl Holzblattsäger 4
Brunner Therese Taglöhnerswe. 4

Rückgebäude.

Herz Herm. Fahrradreparaturwerkst. 0 u. 2
Brendler Ignaz Buchbinder 2
Bleicher Johann Kupferschmied 2
Haseneder Joseph Taglöhner 2
Kronseder Karl Schuhmacher 3
80*Reiserer Jos. Gastwirt GG. 0 u. 2
*Reiserer Zenta deff. Gattin GG. 0 u. 2
Kaffee und Gaststätte Modern 1
Hotel u. Fremdenheim Modern 1

(a) Pollstation

83*Zeiller Therese Bildhauerswe. 2
Willis Karol. Maschinenstrickerin (Laden) 0 u. 3
Klotz Thea Feinkosthdlg. (Laden) 0
Stierhof Ther. Zigarrenhdlg. (Lad.) 0
Auerweck Silvester Offiziant 0
— Kath. Krämerin 0
Finger Max Gesch.-Inh. 0
Willis Quirin Maschinist 1
Burghard Kath. Hofoffizierstenswe. 1
Rast August Eisenbahninspektor 2
Kleebauer Kresz. Sattler u. Tapez.-Witwe 2
— Rosa Damenschneiderin 2
Frank Wilhelm Apotheker 3
Schödel Nikol. Gerichtsvollz.-Insp. 3
Reichenwallner Henr. Rentnerswe. 3
Wedehase Heinrich Chemiker 4
Meier Joseph Zimmermann 4
Oberdörfer Eduard Schreinermstr. 4
Müller Eugenie Verlag, Briefmarkengroßhdlg. 4
— Peter Kaufmann 4

Rückgebäude.

Krum Ludwig Schreiner (Werkst.) 0
Metzger Max Bankbeamter 1

(b) Election Officer

71*Ferretti-Gandolfa Luigi Kaufmann in Genua
Kahn Gustav Schneider (Lad.) 0
Müller Johann Bäcker u. Melber 0
Fackler Franziska Landwirtswe. 0
Heidester Joseph Eisendreher 0
Scherdtel Kresz. Lokomotivf.-We. 1
Renner Xaver Baumeister 1
Sindel Karl Hauptlehrer 1
Dimpfl Ludwig Rechn.-Rat a. D. 2
Sucro Julie Subrektorstochter 2
Bernhard Xaver Schreinermeister 3
Rieger Johann Postassistent 3
Küppers Johanna Kaufmannswe. 3
Höcht Karol. Dienstmannswe. 4
Schloderer Babette Heizerswe. 4
Sedlmayr Joseph Gußmeister 4
Hierl Therese Rentnerswe. 4

Rückgebäude.

Schober Johann Brauereiarbeiter 0
Thoma Franz Schuhmacher 0
Schurer Georg Bahnbediensteter 0
Dorn Arthur Kunstmaler 1
Fischer Maria Oberassistentenswe. 2
Richter Heinrich Chemigraph 2

(c) 2nd. Election Officer

Locating poll station (a) and individuals (b-c) for precinct ("Stimmbezirk") 40 in the 1924 directory.